who has already consented to contribute. These varied contributions will make clear the conflict in interpretations and points of view which still exist in spite of the enormous amount of work given to the subject in the past fifty years.
These two conclusions provide us with a working definition of English mercantilism in its colonial aspects. It had as its purpose, exploitation, and as its means, regulation. Both phases of the problem, exploitation and regulation, are important. To understand the relationship of mercantilism and the Revolution we must not only analyse the extent to which the colonists were exploited but also consider the skill with which they were regulated.
An analysis of how the colonists were exploited is no easy task, as any one knows who has struggled with the many statutory ambiguities involved. The calculations involved in estimating the burdens placed upon the colonial economy are complicated. They call for arithmetical computations involving duties, preferences, or drawbacks of such odd amounts as is. 10d. and 15 16/7,5 of a twentieth of a penny per pound of tobacco. They run afoul of complicated analyses of costs and close decisions about the incidence of taxation. The answer required some thousands of hours of WPA and NYA labour in tabulating the necessary data and hundreds more in analysing and correlating them, the details of which have been compressed in thirty-eight rather dull pages? All that can be attempted here is to state the conclusions and indicate the grounds upon which they are based. We can, however, simplify our analysis of the mercantilist code which exploited the colonies by dividing it into four parts: first, the basic provisions concerning the trans-Atlantic trade; second, the supplementary measures restricting manufactures; third, the subsidiary rules with reference to the American trade; and fourth, the much discussed measures enacted after the French and Indian War.
In examining the first part, we find that the basic provisions concerning the trans-Atlantic trade placed a heavy burden upon the colonies. By means of the Navigation Acts England attempted both to keep foreign vessels out of the colonies and to enable English merchants to share in the more profitable parts of the trans-Atlantic trade. The enumeration of key colonial exports in various Acts from 1660 to 1766 and the Staple Act of 1663 hit at colonial trade both coming and going. The Acts required the colonies to allow English middlemen to distribute such crops as tobacco and rice and stipulated that if the colonies would not buy English manufa.ctures, at least they should purchase their European goods in England. The greatest element in the burden laid upon the colonies was not the taxes assessed. It consisted in the increased costs of shipment, trans-shipment, and middleman's profits arising out of the requirement that England be used as an entrep•t.
The burdens were somewhat lightened by legislation favouring the colonies, but not as much as usually alleged. The suppression of tobacco production in England, for example, was comparatively unimportant to the colonies since the great quantities of colonial tobacco re-exported caused its price to be determined by a world rather than an English market. Moreover, the motive was not goodwill for the colonists but fiscal, since the heavy revenues derived from tobacco could be collected more easily at the waterfront than upon the farm. Likewise, although colonial shipbuilders and shipowners approved the clauses of the Navigation Acts which eliminated Dutch rivals, they did not need such protection. They had managed to carry cargoes and 3L. A. Harper, "The Effect of the Navigation Acts on the Thirteen Colonies" (in The Era of the American Revolution, ed. by Richard B. Morris, New York, 1080).
to build ships which could be sold in the world market before the laws were enacted and they continued to do so after the Revolution. The fact is that colonial shipowners suffered, directly, and colonial shipbuilders, indirectly, under the Navigation Acts since other clauses enabled English shipowners (as contrasted with American) to carry eighty per cent of the trade between the British Isles and the Thirteen Colonies whereas they carried only twenty per cent after the Revolution. 4
Similarly the drawbacks, bounties, and tariff preferences, of which we are so often reminded, did not materially offset the burdens placed upon the trans-Atlantic trade. The drawbacks paid by English customs authorities on foreign products reexported to the colonies should not be listed as a benefit to the colonies. There would have been no duties to be drawn back except for the requirement that the colonists purchase their European goods in England. The portion of the duties which England retained, while less than it might have been, was obvi4Ibid., 8-10, 37. Richard Champion, Considerations on the Present Situation of Great Britain and the United States (London, 1784) declares at pages 27-8 that the ships in the trade between Europe and the Thirteen Colonies totalling 105,000 tons "were generally the property of British merchants, navigated by British seamen" and that they formed "no less than a sixth of our whole shipping," which had previously (p. 13) been stated to be about 1,300,000 tons. Obviously the trans-Atlantic trade of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia included a substantial percentage of colonial-owned ships, but the trans-Atlantic trade of those ports was less than that of Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina, which was overwhelmingly in the hands of British vessels. Thus it seemed wisest to modify Champion's statement somewhat and the estimate of eighty per cent was taken as being a fairly reasonable approximation. Subsequent analyses of the Naval Office lists show that the percentages differed radically from port to port and even within the same port during different years: On the other hand, however, the bounties paid upon colonial products were of real advantage to the colonies. They sustained the growth of indigo in South Carolina, did much to foster the development of naval stores in North Carolina, encouraged the lumber industry in New England, and at the end of the colonial period averaged more than oe65,000 a year for the Thirteen Colonies alone. Similarly the preferences granted colonial products were beneficial in so far as they operated. Although they had no effect upon such commodities as tobacco and rice and their effect upon other commodities is somewhat uncertain, colonial qt is, of course, true that, if one wishes to consider the fairness of the burdens laid upon the colonists, it is relevant to remember that the allowance of drawbacks enabled them to pay lower taxes upon the same goods than the English were assessed. An analysis of the economic burdens upon the colonies, however, is concerned primarily with ascertaining how much the colonists had to pay, not with determining how fair the assessment was. If one lists the drawbacks as a colonial advantage in such an analysis, the entire tax should be calculated as a colonial burden, in which case one will attain exactly the same result reached in the calculations which follow, since the drawback has already been deducted from the gross tax and the only burden considered has been the net tax retained in Britain.
øThe grant of the bounty did not depend upon exportation to the colonies in the case, of any of the bounty-paid products (cordage, corn, certain fish, beef, pork, gunpowder, linen, sailcloth, silk manufactures, and refined sugar), nor in the case of the candles, glass, hides, lace, thread and fringes, leather manufactures, paper calicoes, silks, salt, soap, and starch, the "exciseable goods" which received specified drawbacks or bounties upon exportation (Samuel Baldwin, A Survey of the British Customs, London, 1770, Part II, 19-22). In the case of linens the bounty was paid only for exportations to Africa, America, Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, Minorca, and the East Indies, but those were the only regions in which British linen had an opportunity to compete successfully. It is also important to note that in the year 1773 the exports to the American colonies of bounty-paid linen totalled oe348,464 (of which oe168,314 went to the continental colonies), while less than oe68,000 worth of bounty-paid linen was exported to the rest of the world. During the same year the continental colonies imported almost the same amount of duty-burdened linens, valued at oe.137,248, and similar exports to the British Carribbean amounted to oe102,754 (Customs 3, vol. 73). raw silk, naval stores, and lumber definitely benefited. Yet the total sum represented by such preferences was never great and it is doubtful whether the benefit the Thirteen Colonies thus derived amounted to even one-twentieth of that obtained by the British West Indian planters who in the year 1773 alone, pocketed oeztzt6,000, thanks to a preferential rate which enabled their sugar to hold the English market despite a five-shilling-per-hundredweight differential in price. 7
The uncertainties underlying many of our calculations do not permit an exact statement, but judging from calculations for the year 1773, it would seem that after all proper allowances have been made for bounties and other preferences, the net burden imposed upon the Thirteen Colonies by the restraints upon the 8The estimate of the net burden given here has been modified slightly from that given in Harper, "The Effect of the Navigation Laws," in order to make greater allowances for the possibly beneficial effects of preferential rates on colonial products and for possible errors in estimating the ratio between the pound and the dollar. restraints were very important. 9 Neither extreme appears to accord with the facts. In the case of hats, proximity to the source of supply of furs and the comparatively simple process of manufacturing had led to the development of an industry which appears to have been injured by the legislation, so but the hat industry played only a minor part in the total economy. Woollen manufactures were, of course, much more important, but there is much evidence to indicate that the English prohibitions had little material effect. The colonies found that they were handicapped by an inadequate supply of good wool when they tried to develop homespun goods at the time of the Revolution--and even as late as 1791 Hamilton found that an adequate supply of labour was one of the chief stumbling blocks to his programme for encouraging industry. It required an embargo, a war, and a protective tariff before large-scale woollen manufacturing began to develop, and it did not pass beyond the household stage until many years after being freed of English mercantilism--which, incidentally, had never forbidden the manufacture of homespun for domestic use or local distribution. n In the case of iron manufactures the British legislation encouraged the development of pig and bar iron and tried to discourage the manufacture of more advanced forms, but in both respects the influence of the legislation is doubtful. Because of the proximity of iron ore to forests America had a great advantage in producing crude iron, before coke replaced charcoal, and probably did not need legislative encouragement. With such an advantage in producing crude iron it was only natural that some more advanced iron articles would be produced in the colonies, whatever thorough-going mercantilists might dream about having the crude iron sent over to England and having it returned in the form of pots, pans, and other manufactures?
The various disallowances of colonial laws which were intended to foster colonial manufacturing further illustrate the English intention of discouraging it but, despite that intent, English To one who frankly does not profess to be an expert on the point, it is difficult to understand how British mercantilism discriminated materially against the colonists. It is true that in the manceuvering for land grants, British interests sometimes clashed with colonial interests, but we hear fully as much about clashes between different colonial groups. Both the small frontiersmen and the big speculators were charged more for land than they were accustomed to pay, but it was not as much as they were to be charged by the United States government thereafter. In the readjustments which accompanied the establish- •7These taxes, of course, differed 'in many ways from earlier measures but they had very definite economic effects, however political some of their aims may have been. Consequently, it seemed necessary to include them if our discussion of mercantilism was to be complete.
•8Harper, "Effect of the Navigation Acts," 27-9.
Yet even though the amount of taxation was not great, we must consider the possibility that the form of its assessment detrimentally affected colonial interests. The Tea Act, for one, definitely injured the illicit trade in tea by so reducing the price of the legal article that it lessened, if it did not eliminate, the profit from smuggling? However unfair smugglers may have thought such tactics, they can hardly be said to have injured the economy of the country--especially since tea was not a pivotal commodity.
Molasses, the rum which was made from it, and the provision trade which accompanied it, however, were vital factors in colonial economy, and historians have often called attention to their importance in such books as Rum, Romance, and Rebellion. TM The Sugar Act of 1764 served notice that the British government intended to make its regulations effective when it lowered the duty on foreign sugar and molasses and prohibited the importation of foreign rum entirely. The provisions concerning sugar and rum were comparatively immaterial since no great quantities were imported, but the duty of 3d. per gallon on molasses was another matter, since literally millions of gallons came from the foreign West Indies? • Many feared that the trade could not bear a tax of 3d. per gallon, and in response to their pleas the duty was reduced in 1766 to ld. per gallon and the tax was assessed on both British and foreign molasses. The excitement aroused by these taxes leads one to look for evidence of the havoc which they wrought in trade, but an examination of the wholesale prices of molasses does not disclose any noticeable change attributable to the legislation? •' And if we carry our investi- •2$upra, note 14.
gations further we find that the tax which the federal government placed and kept upon imports of molasses after 1790 almost equaled the 3d. per gallon placed upon foreign molasses in 1764 and materially exceeded the ld. duty retained after 1766. 2a In brief, whatever the connection between rum and romance, the statistics of colonial trade disclose no correlation between rum and rebellion.
In so far as the statistics can be followed, the correlation between wine and rebellion is much closer. The Sugar Act of 1764 had also placed a duty upon wines which gave those imported by way of Britain a preferential rate of oe3 per ton. The preference was not sufficient to enable the English to capture the trade in Madeira wine, but it enabled them to gain a flourishing trade in port which previously had been negligible24 Yet such an infringement of colonial taste hardly seems to justify a revolt--especially when we note that the quantity involved was not large, and that by the post-Revolutionary period Americans preferred port and other wines to Madeira25
Thus, an analysis of the economic effects of British mercantilism fails to establish its exploitire aspects as the proximate cause of the Revolution. The only measures which afforded a sufficient economic grievance were the entrep•t provisions of the Navigation Acts, which governed the trans-Atlantic trade. They helped to create a fundamental economic unbalance, but cannot be connected directly with the Revolution. The colonists had lived under them for more than a century without desiring independence and even in the Revolutionary period with few exceptions the entrep•t provisions were accepted as the mother country's due for the protection which she afforded? In fact, the official •*Seybert, Statistical •4nnals, 164-0, 260. SøThe necessity of taking considerable space to calculate the burdens laid upon the colonies by mercantilism should not be regarded as a denial that Britain had real contributions to make. The benefits of military and naval protection were very important. British merchants also probably helped the colonists to find markets for their products but it is easy to overemphasize such assistance. During the greater part of the time the entrep•t requirements were operative the Dutch were much better qualified to serve efficiently as middlemen in colonial products than the English. Similarly the flattening of the curve of the American tobacco exports after the Revolution is not as significant as it seems at first glance. The destruction wrought representatives of the colonies were willing to guarantee the British commercial system provided that the measures of political taxation were withdrawn?
If there were any inexorable economic forces which were inevitably drawing the colonies toward revolution, they are hard to detect and the colonists were unaware of them.
Anyone who maintains that the Revolution resulted from the inevitable clash of competing capitalisms must reckon with several points: That burdens upon the trans-Atlantic trade were proportionately greater at the beginning of the eighteenth century than in 1776; that the restraints of the land and currency policies were basically the same as those prescribed by the federal government; and that after 1766 the taxes laid on molasses by Britain were less than those imposed by the United States after 1790. He should also explain why the surplus colonial capital alleged to be bursting its confines did not venture into the manufacturing enterprises which the law did not prohibit; why the colonists did not finance their own middlemen in England; and, finally, why they did not pay their debts. If by a clash of expanding capitalism is meant that colonists with money were irritated because their freedom of action was restrained by outside regulation, one must immediately concede that the charge is justified; but such colonial resentment seems more properly classified as a political rather than an economic factor. It is merely an old point dressed in new garb and was better expressed by John Adams when he declared that the American Revolution began when the first plantation was settled?
When we turn, however, from the economic effects of mercantilism to its regulatory aspects, we are faced with a different story. We can establish a direct correlation between mercantilism and the Revolution. Although earlier English regulations had been reasonably satisfactory the regulatory technique by the Revolution, and the interruption to the trade, first by the Revolution, and then by the wars in Europe, would appear to have done much more to discourage tobacco production than the elimination of the laws making Britain an entrepgt. of the British government under George III was pitifully defective. As a mother country, Britain had much to learn. Any modern parents' magazine could have told George III'S ministers that the one mistake not to make is to take a stand and then to yield to howls of anguish. It was a mistake which the British government made repeatedly. It placed a duty of 8d. per gallon on molasses, and when it encountered opposition, reduced it to ld. It provided for a Stamp Act and withdrew it in the face of temper tantrums. It provided for external taxes to meet the colonial objections and then yielded again by removing all except one. When finally it attempted to enforce discipline it was too late. Under the circumstances, no self-respecting child--or colonist--would be willing to yield. Moreover, British reforming zeal came at a very bad time. The colonists were in a particularly sensitive state due to the post-war deflation and the economic distress which accompanied it. The British also attempted to exert unusual control at a time when the removal of the French from Canada had minimized the colonists' dependence upon Britain. Most important of all, the reforms followed one another too rapidly.
In social reform, irritation often is to be measured not so much by what a regulation attempts to achieve as by the extent to which it changes established habits. The early history of English mercantilism itself offers a good illustration of the point. Bitter complaints came from Virginia and Barbados when tobacco and sugar were first enumerated because those colonies had become accustomed to conditions of comparatively free trade, whereas few or no complaints were heard from Jamaica which had developed under the restrictive system. •'ø The mercantilist system was geared for leisurely operation and before George nfs reign succeeded by virtue of that fact. Its early restraints led to Bacon's rebellion in Virginia but fortunately for the mother country the pressure against New England was deferred until the next decade when it, too, led to an explosion in the form of revolt against Andros. aø These uprisings were separated both geographically and chronologically so that neither attained dangerous proportions, and both were followed by a reasonably satisfactory settlement of at least some of the colonial grievances. The University of California,
